By Onora O'Neill
During this choice of essays, Onora O'Neill argues for an account of justice that's essentially cosmopolitan instead of civic, but takes critical account of associations and limits, and of human range and vulnerability. She explores the query of even if the claims and scope of justice are restricted via culturally or politically particular ideas and perspectives, and examines the calls for and scope of simply associations and the potential for an international with porous barriers and dispersed energy. Bounds of Justice will attract readers in philosophy, politics and diplomacy.
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6 In some other writing on justice and on 15 16 For brevity I shall generally use the more abstract, relational term ‘preference’ even where it might be more natural to speak of desires, motivations or inclinations; in speaking of Kant’s position I shall indicate some of his psychological vocabulary in parentheses. : Harvard University Press, ), pictures agents as having complex preferences (desires, interests) which they pursue by instrumentally rational action, –, . In Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, ), he defends a diﬀerent conception of action, speaks of ‘the obvious non-Humean character of this account of motivation’ and claims that ‘the class of motives is wide open’; see –; –.
They must be intelligible. With others who share many speciﬁc beliefs the requirement is readily met. But where they do not, it will be demanding. Reasoning across social and ideological boundaries will often achieve conditional rationality. What both can follow will have a conditional structure, although it may be that only those of one persuasion are willing to aﬃrm the antecedent of the conditionals which both ﬁnd intelligible. 16 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, :–; , in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, tr.
For example, Charles Taylor’s conception of strong evaluation, although he connects it to the idea of second-order preferences, deploys more than the formal notion of a second-order endorsement, and cannot be ﬁtted into an empiricist account of action. ’, in his Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), –. Philosophical bounds of justice So there is no general reason to think that action which receives second-order endorsement is autonomous.